New Delhi, Aug 22 (IANS) Sheikh Hasina ruled Bangladesh for over 15 years, securing four consecutive electoral victories. However, it took just 35 days of student-led protests, supported by a significant portion of the population disillusioned by the country’s struggling economy and rising unemployment, to force her out of office.

The ability of the student movement to effect such a political change without plunging Bangladesh into military rule demonstrates that democracy, however fragile, has taken root in the country.

In stark contrast, Pakistan, from which Bangladesh emerged after a bloody war in 1971, faces an even worse economic and unemployment crisis.

Despite year-long student protests and political campaigns advocating for constitutional supremacy, the de facto ruling military dominated hybrid regime of Pakistan has successfully suppressed every cent of dissent from Balochistan to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to Sindh to Punjab.

This fundamental difference highlights how deeply entrenched the Pakistan Army remains within civilian institutions, reducing its democracy to nothing but a mere illusion.

Yet, the success of the Bangladeshi student’s movement appears to have inspired the Pakistan Students Federation (PSF), a nationwide student organisation, to issue an ultimatum to the government: fulfil their demands by August 30, or face a countrywide agitation.

Among their prominent demands are the restoration of constitutional rule of law, the release of former Prime Minister Imran Khan, who has emerged as a symbol of resistance against the status quo, and the military’s decades-long dominant control over the country’s civilian institutions.

Imran Khan has been imprisoned since August 6, 2023, facing multiple charges including corruption. His wife, Bushra Bibi, who is co-accused in several corruption cases, is also in custody.

While the student calls for democratic revival in Pakistan are encouraging, the situations in Bangladesh and Pakistan are fundamentally different.

In Bangladesh, an elected prime minister, though having concentrated much of power over years, exercised authority over the political system, including the armed forces of the country.

In contrast, in Pakistan, the military retains unassailable power, overseeing a system that functions as an authoritarian hybrid, with only a facade of civilian government.

That should perhaps explain why the protests in Pakistan have largely failed to make any mark with the military establishing using every state resource curb the opposition to its misdeeds.

While the divergent outcome of protest movements in Bangladesh and Pakistan may be intriguing, it requires a deeper examination of their democratic trajectories since 1971, when Bangladesh, then East Pakistan, emerged as an independent state following a bloody military campaign by the Pakistan Army killing thousands of people.

Initially though, both countries exhibited similar tendencies toward military rule.

Bangladesh, for example, has witnessed at least 21 military coup attempts since 1971.

There were three coups in a single year of 1975, beginning with the assassination of its founding President, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, on August 15, 1975.

During the late 1970s and 1980s, the line between military and civilian bureaucracy was blurred, particularly under Ziaur Rehman’s rule who appointed dozens of retired officers to prominent civilian posts besides offering lucrative jobs across other sectors to hundreds of other officers.

However, since 2008 when Bangladesh Army handed over power to popularly elected Sheikh Hasina-led Awami League government following its two-year rule, the military’s role in political affairs has significantly diminished.

This shift was evident during the recent student-led movement when Army Chief General Waker-uz-Zaman informed PM Sheikh Hasina that his forces would not use violence against civilians, ultimately leading to her resignation on August 5, 2024, thereby bringing end to her 15 years of rule.

Though many expected that the military might usurp power, in reality it has facilitated takeover by a civilian interim government.

Additionally, several senior government officials, including Supreme Court judges perceived close to Hasina’s administration, have since resigned to allow the interim government to take shape, restore the rule of law and oversee new elections as soon as possible.

A decade ago, such developments would have been unexpected, as the military was often poised to seize any opportunity to reclaim political power. This distancing of the military from politics marks a significant democratic gain for Bangladesh.

Unlike Bangladesh, where democracy appears to have taken root, Pakistan has struggled to achieve similar progress. The civilian executive in Pakistan has been largely rendered powerless, with the Pakistan Army dominating the country’s political landscape, either through direct military rule or by manipulating governance from behind the scenes.

The Army has strategically infiltrated Pakistan’s institutions through key appointments, while maintaining the appearance of civilian control.

For instance, Lt. Gen. Sajjad Ghani (retd) heads the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), Lt. Gen. Munir Afsar leads the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA), and Maj. Gen. Amer Nadeem (retd) oversees the Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO), among many other significant state institutions.

These appointments allow the military establishment the bandwidth to control every aspect of the Pakistani lives.

As such, the Pakistan Army’s political interference and dominance of national institutions have directly impacted the country’s democratic trajectory, hindering the development of strong and stable civilian democratic institutions in Pakistan.

The Pakistan Military, particularly Pak Army’s institutional hold is such that any civilian leader who dares to challenge its status quo faces severe consequences, as is seen with Imran Khan in the current context.

As James Schwemlein (2023) observes, “Pakistan’s political scene has generally been characterized by one rule: where the Pakistan Army’s will exists, it carries, and typically persists no matter the consequences”.

Pakistan’s military has ensured its political relevance by establishing a vast economic empire, weakening civilian institutions, and fostering internal security challenges. Consider, for instance, its extensive economic empire encompassing almost every economic sector from agriculture, manufacturing, education, and construction to real estate.

These commercial ventures are managed by entities like the Fauji Foundation (FF), Army Welfare Trust (AWT), Shaheen Foundation (SF) and Bahria Foundation (BF), interestingly all designated as services welfare organisations. This economic network has vested the Pakistan Army’s officer class with significant financial interests, compelling the military establishment to maintain its dominance over the country’s establishment.

Pakistani analyst Ayesha Siddiqa (2017) highlights, Pakistan Army uses the capital generated from these enterprises “for the personal benefit of the military fraternity, especially the officer cadre, but is neither recorded nor part of the defence budget”.

As such, Pakistan’s so-called democracy, dominated by the military, is nothing but a mere facade.

It is akin to an arcade game of snakes and ladders, where the Pakistan Army sits at the top, ready to strike anyone who dares to challenge its supremacy or questions its political role. The military’s control is reinforced by collaborators within the judiciary, executive, and civilian bureaucracy, enabling it to maintain near-total control of the country.

Therefore, in such a facade of democracy, while it is commendable that the Pakistan Student Federation has issued an ultimatum to the government to fulfil its demands for upholding constitution and releasing political detainees, led by Imran Khan, however, forcing the military to retreat from the political arena will require more than mere rhetoric. Whether Pakistani students can rise to the occasion like their Bangladeshi counterparts or this is just a glib, only the time will reveal.

[Lt Col JS Sodhi (Retd) is Editor, Global Strategic & Defence News, and the Author of ‘China’s War Clouds: The Great Chinese Checkmate’]

–IANS

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